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Abstract
We investigate the extent to which uncertainties about tax policies affect business
activities. We develop a statewide tax-uncertainty measure (TU measure) and show
that it captures state corporate tax uncertainty. By comparing adjacent counties across
state borders, we show that increasing tax uncertainty by one standard deviation (a
30% increase in the TU measure) leads to a 0.17% point per-year decrease in the growth
rate of establishments over two years. The result holds after conducting a variety of
robustness checks and is not likely to be driven by general state-policy uncertainties.
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1 Introduction
Economists have conjectured that uncertainty about economic policies can influence the real
economy. Recently, Baker et al. [2016] developed a measure of economic policy uncertainty
(EPU), and subsequent studies have documented a correlation between the EPU index and
economic activities. In most cases, however, establishing a causal relationship between the
EPU index and an economic outcome is difficult because a nationwide EPU index provides
only a time-series variation, while there might exist a time-varying unobserved component
that affects both economic policies and economic outcomes.
In this paper, we extend the EPU index to a statewide index and provide a causal
relationship between our extended index and a real outcome. In particular, we focus on
uncertainty about state tax policies.1 We first construct the statewide tax-uncertainty (TU)
measure and show that it is positively associated with the probability of state corporate tax
changes and is more responsive to tax changes that were not pre-announced. For example, a
10% increase in the TU measure is associated with a 1.5% point increase in the probability
of a maximum state corporate tax change in the following year.
To investigate the causal relationship between our TU measure and business activity, we
compare the business outcomes of the counties near a state border. The economic conditions
of the counties near a state border are more likely to be similar, whereas the states to which
they belong are different. Statewide tax policies are less likely to be influenced by the border
counties, and, hence, the changes in tax policies are more likely to be exogenous to the
economic conditions in those counties. In addition, by controlling for a location fixed effect
throughout the analysis, we also account for the fact that different entrepreneurs are sorted
into different border areas. As a result, the identification of our results is mainly obtained
1A large variation exists for tax policies across states. Moreover, of all government policies, taxes are the
biggest concern for business owners (see, e.g., Yardeni et al. [2017]).
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from temporal variation in cross-border economic activities.
Our results suggest that tax uncertainty is negatively associated with the growth rate of
the number of establishments. The baseline estimate suggests that a 10% increase in the TU
measure leads to a 0.11% point decrease in the growth rate of the number of establishments
over two years. If we relate this number to the probability of a maximum state corporate tax
change, a 1.5% point increase in the probability of a maximum state corporate tax change
in the following year leads to a 0.11% point decrease in the growth rate of the number of
establishments over two years. We provide evidence that the deterred investment due to
uncertainty (the “real-option” story), rather than the relocation of establishments in border
counties, is the main mechanism behind our estimates.
The result holds with several robustness checks. In particular, we check whether our
results are driven by some state policy uncertainty other than state tax uncertainty. For
example, we control for a state-year-specific dummy for a tight race in the gubernatorial
election,2 and our results hold. We also check whether our results are different across indus-
tries and show that they are more pronounced among industries that have relatively more
incorporated firms. To the extent that general policy uncertainty affects both incorporated
and non-incorporated firms equally, the aforementioned evidence suggests that our results
are more likely driven by tax uncertainty.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of policy uncertainties on the overall
economy. The study of the impact of policy uncertainties goes back to Friedman [1968].
Recently, Baker et al. [2016] developed an economic policy uncertainty (EPU) measure by
using a newspaper-article count, and many papers show that the EPU measure is negatively
associated with real outcomes.3 In particular, Shoag and Veuger [2016] extend the EPU
2Depending on which party wins the election, either Democrats or Republicans, state policies could be
very different. Therefore, the fact that people cannot predict which party will win the election means that
they are uncertain about which type of policies will be implemented in the next few years.
3See, for example, Antonakakis et al. [2013], Colombo [2013], Jones and Olson [2013], Kang and Ratti
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measure to a statewide measure and show it matches the cross-sectional distribution of
unemployment rates during the Great Recession. By implementing a local identification
strategy based on adjacent counties across US state borders, we control for a time-varying
unobserved component that might affect both state policies and economic outcomes, and,
hence, provide results with a clean identification. Overall, our results suggest that, among
many policy uncertainties, tax uncertainty has a significant, negative impact on business
activity in the United States.4
This paper is also related to the literature studying the effect of tax policies on business
activities. The early studies on this subject find that taxes do not appear to have a substan-
tial effect on economic activities in US states.5 The more recent literature revisits the issue
by focusing on improving an identification problem, with mixed results.6 We contribute to
this literature by showing that uncertainties about tax policies, even if the tax eventually
[2013], Antonakakis et al. [2014], Baker et al. [2014], Da et al. [2014], Kang et al. [2014], Karnizova and Li
[2014], Nodari [2014], Wang et al. [2014], Brogaard and Detzel [2015], Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. [2015],
Gulen and Ion [2015], Liu and Zhang [2015], Bernal et al. [2016], Bordo et al. [2016], Leduc and Liu [2016],
Li et al. [2015], and Caggiano et al. [2017].
4Regarding tax-policy uncertainty, Hassett and Metcalf [1999] show how such uncertainties affect firm-
level and aggregate investment. Aizenman and Marion [1993] and Aizenman and Marion [1999] empiri-
cally examine the impact of policy uncertainty on investment and economic growth by using cross-country
variations. Edmiston [2004] examines the relationship between tax volatility and investments by using a
cross-section of the 15 countries of the European Union, the United States, and Japan. To construct a
tax-uncertainty measure, Edmiston [2004] generates the effective tax rates using each country’s national
accounts and revenue statistics, under the assumption that the data-generating process is based on a gen-
eral equilibrium representative agent model. Using these inferred effective tax rates, he estimates tax-rate
volatility using an ARCH specification and shows that the effect of the estimated volatility on investment per
worker is negative with a time-invariant country-specific fixed effect. We augment his finding by developing
a novel measure of tax-policy uncertainty based on the news-article-count information, and by controlling
for a time-variant unobserved factor that might affect both tax uncertainty and an economic outcome.
5For a review article, refer to Wasylenko [1999].
6For example, using data on French plants, Rathelot and Sillard [2008] find that a higher local corporate
tax deters new-firm formation. Duranton et al. [2011] also find a negative impact of local taxation on
employment growth, but not on firm entry, by using establishment data in the UK. On the other hand,
Chirinko and Wilson [2008] find that the impact of US state investment tax credits on manufacturing
establishment counts is economically small. Rohlin et al. [2014] find that the impact of taxes on business
creation around the state borders differs depending on reciprocal agreements that require workers to pay
income tax to their state of residence rather than their state of employment. Using US Census micro-data
on multi-state firms, Giroud and Rauh [2017] show a negative impact of state taxes on the number of
establishments in the state. They also show that reallocation of productive resources to other states drives
half the effect.
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does not change, can negatively influence business activities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the procedure by which the
statewide TU measure is constructed, and discuss its validation. Section 3 discusses the
identification strategy and presents the main results. Section 4 shows robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring Tax Uncertainty
In this section, we construct a measure that may capture tax uncertainty. We explain how
we construct such a measure in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we provide some evidence that
the TU measure captures state corporate tax uncertainty.
2.1 Constructing the Tax-Uncertainty Measure
To construct a TU measure, we extend the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index con-
structed by Baker et al. [2016] to the state level. Using ten leading US nationwide newspa-
pers, they search for articles containing the following trio of terms: “economic” or “economy”;
“uncertain” or “uncertainty”; and one or more of “Congress,” “deficit,” “Federal Reserve,”
“legislation,” “regulation,” or “White House.” They construct the EPU index by using the
time variation of the relative number of articles containing the above keywords. They show
that the EPU index exhibits a strong relationship with the implied stock market volatility
and a policy-uncertainty measure from the Federal Reserve System’s Beige Books. They
also show that their newspaper-article counting method is reliable, in the sense that it has
a strong correlation with the hand-collected economic policy-uncertainty measure.
To construct a TU measure, we follow the same procedure as in Baker et al. [2016], except
that we use (1) ten statewide newspapers to construct a statewide measure and (2) the
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following trio of terms to capture uncertainty for local tax policies: “tax,” “taxes,” “taxed,”
or “taxation”; “local” or “state”; and “uncertain,” “uncertainty,” or “uncertainties.”
To collect the newspaper-count information, we use NewsLibrary (www.newslibrary.com),
an archive of news articles from major newspapers across the United States. We limit the
time period to between 2001 and 2010 because the number of articles before and after 2001
changes substantially for some states in the archive. To make the time period consistent
with other variables, we use information up to 2010. To collect statewide information, we
first select newspapers for each state, among which we search for the articles. The selection
criteria are as follows: first, we sort newspapers by their covered period; second, we select
ten English-language newspapers with the longest covered periods; and third, we remove
newspapers if the covered period does not span from 2001 to 2010. The selected newspapers
are shown in Appendix C. For some states, the number of newspapers that satisfy the above
criteria is five or fewer.7 With a small number of newspapers, the variance of the number of
newspaper articles is rather high, and the newspaper-count information may reflect one or
two particular newspapers. For these reasons, we remove from our main analysis the states
with five or fewer selected newspapers.
For each year, we search for articles containing the trio of keywords specified above among
the ten selected newspapers for each state. For each year, we also search for all the articles
from the ten selected newspapers for each state. Across years and states, we first divide
the number of news articles with keywords by the number of all news articles. Then, we
normalize these values so that the mean value across time and states is 100.
The selected newspapers may be different across states with respect to unobserved char-
acteristics. To address this concern, we include a state fixed effect for all the regression
analyses throughout the paper. To address any concerns about the particular set of key-
7Those states include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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words stated above, we try a different set of keywords and discuss how it differs from the
benchmark keywords. We present this analysis in Appendix B.
Figure 1 shows the histogram for the one-year percentage change in the TU measure
across time and states. The mean is 0.01 and the shape of the distribution looks similar
to that of a normal distribution. The standard deviation is 0.31, indicating considerable
variation across time and states.
Figure 2 shows the average and the standard deviation of the one-year percentage change
in the TU measure during the sample period (from 2001 to 2010) for each state. The figure
shows a large heterogeneity of TU measure across states. To systematically investigate the
relationship between the TU measure and tax uncertainty, we turn to regression analyses in
the next section.
2.2 Does the TU Measure Capture Tax Uncertainty?
2.2.1 The TU measure and the Probability of Tax Changes
In this section, we conduct several regression analyses for the dummy variable indicating a
state tax change in the following year on the log TU measure. All the analyses include state
and year fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered by state.
Most states use a progressive tax system for personal income tax, and some use it for
corporate income tax. Moreover, exemption, deduction, and other tax policies, such as ap-
portionment rules, are different across time and states. Following the literature (e.g., Rohlin
et al. [2014]), we use the maximum state personal income tax, maximum state corporate
income tax, and state sales tax between 2001 and 2010 for this study.8 In doing so, we
8The maximum state personal income tax rate is obtained from the NBER tax simulator. (Source:
http://users.nber.org/ taxsim/state-rates). We use the maximum state corporate income tax collected by
Serrato and Zidar [2016]. We thank the authors for kindly sharing their data. The state sales tax is collected
from the Tax Foundation. (Source: https://taxfoundation.org/data)
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assume that the maximum tax rates are positively associated with the tax rate that most
business owners are concerned about.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for state tax rates, as well as the one-year difference
in the state tax rates. Considerable variation exists in all tax rates across states. The
variation for corporate and personal income tax rates is slightly higher than the one for
the sales tax rate. The median one-year difference in the tax rate is zero for all taxes, but
the standard deviations are 0.37%, 0.33%, and 0.27% for the maximum corporate tax, the
maximum personal tax, and the sales tax, respectively. Indeed, many states changed one of
these tax rates at least once between 2001 and 2010. For example, 11 states changed the
maximum corporate income tax rates; 30 states changed the maximum personal income tax
rates; and 22 states changed sales tax rates.
We first estimate linear probability models for each type of tax change. The results are
shown in Table 2. A 10% increase in the TU measure leads to a 1.5% point increase in the
probability of a state corporate tax change in the next year. By contrast, the coefficients
for the TU measure are not significant in regressions for state personal and state sales tax
changes.
Even if we do not explicitly include the term “corporate” or “business,” the TU measure
is more responsive to state corporate tax changes than to other types of state tax changes.
This may be the case because, although statewide corporate tax changes are less frequent,
they are often substantial and, therefore, attract more attention from newspapers. For the
state corporate tax, the frequency of changes is the lowest, but the magnitude of a change
is, on average, the largest. For example, the absolute value of a tax change is, on average,
1.01% for a state corporate tax, whereas it is 0.69% for a state sales tax and 0.28% for a
state personal tax.
To further investigate why the TU measure predicts only the changes in the state corpo-
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rate tax, and not in the other types of state taxes, we construct another measure by using
the following quadruple of terms: “tax,” “taxes,” “taxed,” or “taxation”; “local” or “state”;
“uncertain,” “uncertainty,” or “uncertainties”; “corporate,” business,” or “businesses.” Note
that the only difference from the benchmark keywords are the additional terms “corporate,”
“business,” or “businesses.” We find that the correlation between the benchmark TU mea-
sure and this newly constructed measure with the additional terms is 0.9252. This finding
indeed confirms our conjecture that a newspaper article that contains the benchmark trio of
terms is more likely to be related to a corporate tax change.
To see whether the result for the state corporate tax change is driven mostly by either an
increase or a decrease in the state corporate tax, we further divide the sample into two: one
that excludes the state corporate tax decrease and another that excludes the state corporate
tax increase. The results are shown in the first and second columns, respectively, of Table
3. The TU measure is positively associated with both samples, although the coefficient for
the second sample is not significant.
Tables 2 and 3 include states that never instituted the state corporate tax changes.
Among states for which the TU measure is available, 11 changed their state corporate tax
rates between 2001 and 2010.9 We estimate linear probability models for the states that did
experience a state corporate tax change. The results are shown in Table 4. The coefficients
for the log TU measure are substantially greater than those in Tables 2 and 3. For example,
the first regression indicates that a 10% increase in the TU measure leads to about a 6.5%
point increase in the probability of tax changes in the following year.
9Those states are Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee.
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2.2.2 Controlling for the Expected Tax Rates
The analyses, so far, suggest that the TU measure is correlated with an unconditional tax
change in the following year. To see whether the TU measure is related to the probability
of tax changes conditional on the expected tax rate, we conduct two additional analyses.
First, we use the mean of other states’ corporate tax rates as proxies for the expected tax
rate in the following year. The literature (e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew [2000]; Serrato and
Zidar [2016]) suggests that competition with other states is an important factor affecting
statewide tax policies. We estimate the regression in the first columns of Table 2 and Table
4, including the mean of other states’ corporate tax rates. The results are shown in Table
5. The mean of other states’ corporate tax is positively correlated with the probability of
tax changes in the following year. The adjusted R-squared also increases after including the
mean of other states’ corporate tax. More importantly, even after controlling for the mean
of other states’ corporate tax rates, the estimates for the TU measure are significant and
exhibit a positive relationship with the probability of tax changes in the following year.
Second, we exclude states that pre-announced their state corporate tax changes to deter-
mine how the estimates for the TU measure change. Although we do not know whether a tax
change was not involved in a change in the expected tax rate, in certain cases, we do know
that a tax change was pre-announced and, therefore, definitely involved in a change in the
expected rate. For example, Michigan legislation implemented a pre-determined elimination
of its Single Business Tax (SBT) in the early 2000s. The SBT rate was successively re-
duced by 0.1% increments from 2000 until 2002.10 Likewise, starting in 2005, Ohio gradually
phased out the corporation franchise tax as part of implementing the commercial activity
tax (CAT).11 These tax changes were pre-announced, and, hence, they were “certain” re-
10Hines Jr [2002] and the Book of the States.
11Source: http://www.tax.ohio.gov
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ductions. If the TU measure captures tax uncertainty, it must be more responsive to other
relatively unexpected tax changes than to the pre-announced tax reductions in Michigan and
Ohio.
We conduct the regression analysis as in Table 4, except that we remove the observations
from Michigan and Ohio. The results are shown in Table 6. For comparison, we also present
the results from Table 4. After removing the observations from Michigan and Ohio, the
magnitude of the coefficient for the TU measure increases. More importantly, the magnitude
of the coefficient for the TU measure for a state corporate tax “decrease” changes from 0.376
to 0.466, and the coefficient becomes significant. The results show that the TU measure is,
in fact, more responsive to relatively unexpected tax changes.12
To summarize, the TU measure predicts mainly state corporate tax changes, either an
increase or decrease, in the following year. The results hold even after controlling for the
expected tax rate. Moreover, the TU measure is more responsive to tax changes that were
not pre-announced. These findings suggest that the TU measure captures the state corporate
tax uncertainty.
3 The TU Measure and Business Activity
In this section, we first explain how we establish a causal relationship between the TU
measure and an output measure. After constructing the output measure and other variables,
we present the main results.
12As a robustness check, we conducted the logit regression and found similar results.
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3.1 Identification Strategy
Statewide tax policies may reflect the economic conditions in the state. For example, a state
government in an economic boom period could have an incentive to raise the state tax rate
to finance state spending. On the other hand, a state government in a recession period may
cut the state tax rate to boost the local economy. At the same time, business activities in
a state are highly influenced by the state’s economic conditions. Therefore, the relationship
between business activities and uncertainties about tax policies can be a mere correlation.
To investigate the causal relationship, we compare the economic outcomes in the counties
near a state border. The economic conditions of the counties near a state border are more
likely to be similar, while the states to which they belong are different. Statewide tax policies
are less likely to be influenced by the border counties, and, hence, the changes in tax policies
are more likely to be exogenous to those counties’ economic conditions.
Another issue to consider is firm sorting: entrepreneurs may differ according to the border
area to which they are sorted. To handle this issue, we control for a location fixed effect
throughout our analyses. Therefore, the identification of our results is obtained mainly from
temporal variation in cross-border economic activities.
To make our argument clearer, consider business activities of the A and B sides of a state
border, given as follows:
gAit = θ ln(TU
A
it) + βX
A
it + Ωit + τ
A
i + u
A
it (1)
gBit = θ ln(TU
B
it) + βX
B
it + Ωit + τ
B
i + u
B
it , (2)
where i and t represent a state border and year, respectively. gAit and g
B
it refer to the outcome
of interest on side A and side B of a state border, respectively. XAit and X
B
it represent
other policy variables that may affect the outcome on side A and side B of a state border,
12
respectively. τAi and τ
B
i capture a time-invariant heterogeneity of each side of border i.
Ωit captures a border-specific unobserved economic condition at t. u
A
it and u
B
it are other
unobserved components on each side of border i at t, which have zero-mean. The key
assumption is that the size of border counties is small enough not to influence a statewide
tax policy, and, as a result, uAit and u
B
it are independent of the statewide tax uncertainty.
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To show how comparing border counties can mitigate the endogeneity issue explained
above, we subtract equation (2) from equation (1):
gAit − gBit = θ
{
ln(TUAit)− ln(TUBit)
}
+ β
(
XAit −XBit
)
+ ξi + it. (3)
By subtracting the above two equations, we can remove the unobserved time-varying border-
specific economic condition Ωit. Note that ξi = τ
A
i − τBi and it = uAit − uBit .
To summarize, by comparing border counties, we can control for time-varying border
specific economic conditions that might also affect the outcome of interest. By additionally
including the border-side fixed effects, we can control for a site-specific effect such as the
firm-sorting effect.
3.2 Output Measure and Other Variables
County Business Pattern (CBP) is used to capture business activities. The CBP provides the
number of establishments in each county for an establishment-size category and a detailed
industry category.14 We use a two-year growth rate, as calculated below, of the number of
13The literature that implements this idea goes back to Fox [1986] and David [1994]. Holmes [1998]
implements this border technique to investigate the role of a right-to-work law on manufacturing activity.
The following papers use a similar technique to examine the effect of statewide government policies: state
investment tax credits (ITC) (Chirinko and Wilson [2008]); the minimum wage (Dube et al. [2010]); local tax
policies on business location choice (Rohlin et al. [2014]); and the changes in statewide homestead exemption
levels (Rohlin and Ross [2016]).
14A firm pays taxes based on the location of its establishments. For a detailed discussion of how a muti-
state firm is taxed, see Giroud and Rauh [2017].
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establishments for all industries, denoted by y, as the main outcome variable:
gt =
yt+2 − yt{
0.5× (yt+2 + yt)
} × 100. (4)
Starting an actual business from the time that the owner came up with the business idea
takes more than a year. Similarly, a large investment, such as a major growth decision,
requires enough time to check all the necessary conditions and to implement the actual
investments. Tax uncertainty at t could influence potential business owners at t, and the
outcome some time later will capture this impact. We use the two-year difference as our
main specification.15
To capture XAit and X
B
it , we include the maximum state personal tax, the maximum
state corporate tax, and the state sales tax rates. We also include the state’s minimum
wage, which might affect the state’s business activity. Theoretically, minimum wages can
influence business owners’ hiring decision by raising the hiring cost.16
We need to specify the counties “near” a state border. Following Holmes [1998], we
choose the counties whose distance to a state border is less than 25 miles in the baseline
analysis.17 However, our results are robust to alternative definitions, such as, counties within
15, 20 or 30 miles of a state border.
Figure 3 shows the number of establishments in counties within 25 miles of a state
border in 2001. Some of the adjacent counties at a border exhibit a very different number
of establishments and may have a quite different economic environment. To reduce such
idiosyncrasy, we choose all counties on one side of a border and all counties on the other side
15Rohlin et al. [2014] use a similar specification.
16Economists have tested this prediction and found mixed results. (e.g., Dube et al. [2010]; Neumark et al.
[2014]). The minimum wage data are from Allegretto et al. [2017]. We thank the authors for making their
data available on the website.
17We thank Thomas J. Holmes for making his data about US state borders available on his website.
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as the pair for our analysis.18
The TU measure is not available for many Western states. Moreover, Western states
tend to have geographically large counties. As a result, the economic conditions in counties
near the border in Western states look quite different from those in other states. For this
reason, we exclude Western states from our analysis.19
While the representation of equation (3) is useful for expositional purpose, we use the
observations from both sides of a border and include border-pair-time fixed effects, as well as
the border-side (i.e., the A or B side of a border) fixed effects. After excluding Western states
and states in which the TU measure is not available, 55 border-pairs and 110 border-sides
remain. In all specifications, the standard errors are clustered by border-pair and state.20
3.3 Main Result
Before discussing our main result, we first run a regression with only the level of taxes and
minimum wages. The result is shown in the first column of Table 7. The state corporate tax
and state personal tax rates are negatively associated with establishment growth rates. The
coefficient for corporate tax, however, is near zero. The coefficients for the state sales tax
rates and minimum wages are positive and the standard errors are relatively high. Retail
customers typically pay sales tax, and, therefore, many sectors may not be directly affected
by a change in sales tax rates. The minimum wage may affect the restaurant industry or
other industries that hire relatively low-income workers, but the proportion of such industries
might be small among all industries.
Some borders never experienced a change in state corporate tax on either side of the
18For counties with multiple adjunct states, we assign a state border with the shortest distance.
19The Western states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ore-
gon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
20We use STATA command reghdfe, developed by Correia et al. [2016], which implements the clustering
method of Cameron et al. [2011].
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border. This may be why the coefficient for corporate tax is near zero in the first regression.
In the second regression, shown in the second column of Table 7, we use only the 29 borders
at which at least one side experienced a change in state corporate tax rates between 2001 and
2010. Indeed, once we condition on the borders that exhibit a variation of state corporate
tax rates, the coefficient for corporate tax becomes much higher − -0.0002 vs. -0.0518 −
even though the standard errors are still large.
Our main result, presented in the third column of Table 7, shows the regression result from
the main specification in Section 3.1. First, the negative relationship between the outcome
and the level of corporate tax becomes much more pronounced − -0.00017 vs. -0.015 − once
we control for the TU measure. This finding suggests that part of the reason for the almost
zero effect of the level of corporate tax is the omitted variation of tax uncertainty.
Second, the coefficient for the log TU measure, θ, is estimated at -1.073, meaning that
a 10% increase in the TU measure leads to approximately a 0.11% point decrease in the
growth rate of the establishments over two years. Another interpretation is that increasing
tax uncertainty by one standard deviation (a 30% increase in the TU measure) leads to
a 0.17% point per-year decrease in the growth rate of establishments over two years. Or
moving from the 25th percentile to 75th percentile of the distribution of one-year percentage
change of TU measures between 2001 and 2010, which corresponds to a 40% increase in
the TU measure, reduces the two-year establishment growth rates by about 0.44%. If we
relate this number to the probability of a maximum state corporate tax change, a 1.5% point
increase in the probability of a maximum state corporate tax change in the following year
leads to a 0.11% point decrease in the growth rate of the number of establishments over two
years.
In the fourth column of Table 7, we include the mean of other states’ corporate tax rates
as proxies for the expected tax rate in the following year. When the year fixed effect is
16
controlled for, the arithmetic mean of other states’ corporate tax rates is linearly dependent
on the state’s corporate tax rate. For this reason, we use the geometric mean of other states’
tax rates. A 1% point increase in the mean of other states’ corporate tax rates leads to
a 2% point decrease in the growth rate of the establishments over two years, although the
standard error is rather large. More importantly, the coefficient for the log TU measure
rarely changes.
Next, we exclude observations from the period of the Great Recession (from 2008 to
2010). As shown in the fifth column of Table 7, the coefficient for the log TU measure
changes only slightly, from -1.073 to -1.225. This result suggests that our results are not
particularly driven by the Great Recession.
3.4 Understanding the Mechanism
Our estimates are based on the information from border counties and the effect of tax
uncertainty may be border-specific. For example, an establishment on Side A of a border
may relocate to the other side of the border in response to tax uncertainty; this relocation
may be observed mainly among establishments in border counties due to a relatively low
moving cost. If this relocation is the main mechanism behind our estimates, the aggregate
effect of tax uncertainty is much lower than our estimates suggest.
To test whether the effect of tax uncertainty is particularly observed among border coun-
ties, we consider the following equation:
gct =θ ln(TUst) + θb ln(TUst) · Borderc + βXst + βbXst · Borderc + τc + uct, (5)
where c and s stand for county and state, respectively. gct is the two-year establishment
growth rate in county c in year t. TUst is the TU measure for state s in year t, and Xst
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includes state taxes and minimum wages in year t. τc refers to a time-invariant county-fixed
effect, and uct is a random component of county c in year t with zero-mean. Borderc is the
dummy variable, which indicates that a county c is a border county.
We are interested in whether the effect of the TU measure is particularly pronounced for
border counties − in other words, whether θˆb is statistically significant. We further control
for any time-varying state-specific effect by including state-time fixed effects ψct, and we
estimate θb as follows:
gct =θb ln(TUst) · Borderc + βbXst · Borderc + τc + ψst + uct. (6)
The estimation result is shown at Table 8. θb is estimated as near zero and insignificant,
indicating that the effect of the TU measure is not particularly higher among border counties.
This finding suggests that the relocation of establishments in border counties is not a main
driving force behind our estimates.
4 Robustness Checks
4.1 Other Policy Uncertainty
Tax uncertainty may be correlated with other types of policy uncertainty. For example, the
uncertainty about a state’s budget condition may increase both tax uncertainty and other
policy uncertainty. Although it is not feasible to cleanly separate tax uncertainty from other
policy uncertainty, we provide two reasons that we believe our results are driven mainly by
tax-policy uncertainty.
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Controlling for general policy uncertainty measures
First, we estimate the main specification in equation (3) by including three measures that
may capture general policy uncertainty. The first measure is a state’s mid-year budget cut.
A state that faces an unforeseen budget situation can adjust the state budget in mid-year.
We use the amount of this mid-year budget cut, normalized by the state’s population, as the
first measure to capture general policy uncertainty.21
The second measure is a state-year specific dummy variable indicating whether a state
experienced a tight race for the gubernatorial election in that year. Depending on whether a
Democrat or a Republican wins the election, state policies could be very different. Therefore,
the fact that people cannot predict which party will eventually win the election means that
they are uncertain about the type of policies that will be implemented in the next few years.
An election is defined as a tight race if the difference in voting share between the winner and
the runner-up is less than 10%.22
We construct the third policy uncertainty measure similarly to Baker et al. [2016]. With
the same set of newspapers used to generate the TU measure, we use the following trio of
terms to generate a general policy uncertainty measure: “policy” or “policies”; “local” or
“state”; and “uncertain,” “uncertainty,” or “uncertainties.” Note that we replace the tax-
related terms for the TU measure with “policy” or “policies” to generate a general state
policy uncertainty measure.
The estimation results are reported in Table 9. In the first regression, we include the
state budget cut variable. The estimate for the budget cut variable is near zero, and the
21Mian and Sufi [2014] use the same measure to capture policy uncertainty. The data for
mid-year budget cut are from the website of the National Association of State Budget Officers
(https://www.nasbo.org/reports-data/fiscal-survey-of-states). The money value is normalized by one USD
in 2010 by using the consumer price index. The data for state population are from the website of the St.
Louis FED (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/).
22The data for US gubernatorial elections are from the website of Our Campaigns
(https://www.ourcampaigns.com/).
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estimate for the log TU measure rarely changes. In the second regression, we include the
tight-election dummies. Although the standard error is rather high, the tight-election dummy
shows a negative relationship with the two-year establishment growth rates. For a state that
experienced a tight gubernatorial race, about a 0.68% point of the two-year establishment
growth rate decreased, on average. More importantly, the estimate for the log TU measure is
almost the same. In the third regression, we include the general policy uncertainty measure
(PU) generated by the newspaper article count. The effect of the PU is marginal and not
significant. The estimate for the log TU measure changes marginally. In the fourth column of
Table 9, we include all three general policy measures. Again, the result for the TU measure
rarely changes. Overall, our result is robust to including measures that are more likely to
capture general policy uncertainty.
The results in Table 9 do not necessarily mean that general policy uncertainty does not
matter. The fact that the coefficients for the tight-election dummy and for the log PU
measure are negative suggests that general policy uncertainty may also negatively influence
business activity. The fact that the effect of tax uncertainty is pronounced even after control-
ling for other policy uncertainty measures suggests that, among many policy uncertainties,
tax uncertainty is one of the most relevant for business activity. This finding is in line with
a survey result by business owners in the United States. The National Federation of Inde-
pendent Businesses has conducted a state-level survey for business owners for more than 30
years. One of the survey questions is: “What is the single most important problem facing
your business today?” The most common choice for all survey years except for those during
the Great Recession is taxes.23 Business owners may care the most about the tax among
relevant government policies, because it directly affects their future income stream.
23Possible choices include (1) taxes, (2) inflation, (3) poor sales, (4) finance and interest rates, (5) cost of
labor, (6) government regulation and red tape, (7) competition from large businesses, (8) quality of labor,
(9) cost/availability of insurance, and (10) others.
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Sub-sample analysis for two types of industries
To the extent that general policy uncertainty equally affects both incorporated and non-
incorporated firms, the effect of our TU measure should be more pronounced among indus-
tries with relatively more incorporated firms if the TU measure indeed captures corporate
tax uncertainty. On the other hand, if our TU measure merely captures general policy uncer-
tainty, the effect should be more or less similar across industries, regardless of the proportion
of incorporated firms.
To test this prediction, we conduct sub-sample analyses: one with industries having a
relatively large proportion of incorporated firms, the other with industries having a relatively
small proportion of incorporated firms. To classify industries with respect to the proportion
of incorporated firms, we refer to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
a nationally representative household-based survey of the US population.24 Using 2004
and 2008 non-overlapping panels, we calculate the proportion of business owners across
different industries. “Manufacturing,” “Wholesale trade,” “Finance, insurance, real estate,
and rental and leasing,” and “Information” are the four industry categories that exhibit
the largest proportion of incorporated firms, at 44%, 43%, 39%, and 37%, respectively.
On the other hand, “Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting,” “Other Services (except
Public Administration),” “Educational Services and Health Care and Social Assistance,” and
“Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services” are the four industry categories that exhibit
the smallest proportion of incorporated firms, at 13%, 18%, 25%, and 28%, respectively.
Table 10 shows the estimation results. In the first column, we report the result with
industries having a large proportion of incorporated firms. The coefficient for the log TU
measure is estimated at -1.316, slightly larger than -1.073, the estimate for the benchmark
regression. The second column shows the result with industries having a small proportion
24Source: https://www.census.gov/sipp
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of incorporated firms. The coefficient for the log TU measure is insignificant, as opposed
to that for industries with a large proportion of corporations. Overall, the effect of the
TU measure is more pronounced in industries in which the proportion of incorporated firms
is higher, which supports the view that the TU measure captures the state corporate tax
uncertainty rather than general policy uncertainty.
4.2 Other Outcome Variables
In this section, we investigate the relationship between our TU measure and other outcome
variables. First, by using the CBP, we construct a two-year growth rate of employment
similar to equation (4):
Employment growtht =
Et+2 − Et{
0.5× (Et+2 + Et)
} × 100, (7)
where Et is the employment level in year t. Theoretically, if tax uncertainty is holding back
investment through the wait-and-see channel, it should also deter employment growth. To
test this theoretical prediction, we estimate the main specification (the specification in the
third column of Table 7) with employment growth as the dependent variable. The estimation
result is reported in the first column of Table 11. The coefficient for the log TU measure is
estimated at -2.116, meaning that a 10% increase in the TU measure leads to approximately
a 0.21% point decrease in the growth rate of employment over two years. Note that the
estimate for the two-year establishment growth rate is -1.073 (the third column of Table 7),
indicating that the response of employment growth is larger than that of the establishment
growth rate. The key difference between establishment growth and employment growth is
that the former does not take into account the intensive margin of investment, whereas the
latter does. This finding suggests that tax uncertainty also affects the growth decisions of
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incumbent business owners.
Second, as another outcome variable, we construct the new-firm entry rate using the
Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI) of the U.S. Census Bureau. The QWI provides em-
ployment at firms whose age is between 0 and 1, as well as the total employment in each
county. With these data, we calculate the employment-weighted new-firm entry rate (job-
creation rate from birth) as follows:
Job-creation rate from birtht =
Employment at firm age 0-1 in year t
Total employment in year t
× 100. (8)
The estimation result is reported in the second column of Table 11. The coefficient for the
log TU measure is estimated at -0.112, meaning that a 10% increase in the TU measure leads
to approximately a 0.01% point decrease in the employment-weighted new-firm entry rate.
Note that the average job-creation rate from birth in the main sample is 4.5%. Conditional
on the average job-creation rate from birth, the magnitude of the estimate for the log TU
measure is very small. Moreover, the standard error for the coefficient is large. Overall, the
regression result suggests that the effect of tax uncertainty is not particularly pronounced
for new-firm entry. New businesses are more likely to be unincorporated. Because our
tax uncertainty measure is most relevant for corporate tax uncertainty, job creation by
unincorporated startups are less likely to be affected by our measure. This finding is also
in line with the regression result for employment growth. Although the entry decision by
potential entrepreneurs is an important, irreversible investment, the growth decision (e.g.,
hiring more employees) by incumbent establishments is as important as the entry decision.
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4.3 Other Robustness Checks
In this section, we report several other robustness checks. We first estimate the main empir-
ical specification without state borders, for which the economic conditions in side A and side
B differ considerably. More specifically, we drop five state borders in which the difference
in the number of establishments between side A and side B is greatest in 2001. The result
is presented in the second column in Table 12. Compared to the baseline case, the value of
the estimate for θ changes only slightly, from -1.073 to -1.012, suggesting that the borders
at which adjacent counties exhibit significantly different economic conditions are not the
primary driver of the main results.
The TU measure may be responsive mainly to the case in which an actual tax change
occured. To check whether the states that experienced the actual tax change are the primary
driver of our results, we include an interaction term for the log TU measure and the dummy
indicating that a state actually experienced a corporate tax rate change. The result is pre-
sented in the third column in Table 12. The coefficient for the interaction term is estimated
to be insignificant, suggesting that the negative effect of the TU measure is not driven by
states in which the actual state corporate tax change was realized.
Starting in 2009, many states increased their unemployment-benefit duration by imple-
menting either the Extended Benefit (EB) or the Emergency Unemployment Compensation
(EUC) program in response to the Great Recession.25 To capture heterogeneity in the
unemployment-benefit duration, we classify states into three groups as of December 2010:
(1) not eligible for the EB; (2) eligible for the EB and not eligible for the EUC tier 4;26
and (3) eligible for the EB and for the EUC tier 4. We construct two dummy variables for
2010.27 The first dummy variable, EB, indicates states that were eligible for the EB at the
25For a detailed discussion of the unemployment-benefit duration during the Great Recession, see Hagedorn
et al. [2015].
26Note that, as of December 2010, all states in our sample were eligible for the EUC tiers 1, 2, and 3.
27The eligibility for the EB or EUC program between 2009 and 2010 changes several times within a
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end of 2010. The second dummy variable, EUC4, indicates states that were eligible for tier
4 of the EUC, as well as for the EB at the end of 2010. In the fourth column of Table 12, we
additionally control for these dummy variables. First, the coefficients for the dummy vari-
ables is negative, suggesting that states that implemented a longer unemployment-benefit
duration tended to experience lower establishment growth. Second, the coefficient for the
log TU measure rarely changes, indicating that our main results hold even after controlling
for the increased unemployment-benefit duration during the Great Recession.
In 2005, Louisiana’s and Mississippi’s TU measure increased dramatically. Both states’
high increase in the TU measure coincided with Hurricane Katrina, which caused severe de-
struction in there. The uncertainty in the states’ budget condition caused by the hurricane
is likely to have increased tax uncertainty. At the same time, Hurricane Katrina might also
have increased other types of uncertainty. As a robustness check, we exclude the observa-
tions from Louisiana and Mississippi and re-estimate the main specification. The result is
presented at the fifth column of Table 12. The main result still holds.
Next, as a placebo test, we regress the previous growth rate, calculated as
gt−1 =
yt−1 − yt−2{
0.5× (yt−1 + yt−2)
} × 100,
on the TU measure. The result is presented in the sixth column in Table 12, which clearly
shows no relationship between the TU measure and the previous growth rate.
We use the two-year establishment growth rate as our main outcome variable. In Table
13, we report the results for the one-year and three-year establishment growth rates along
with the two-year growth rate. First, the coefficient for the log TU measure, θ, is estimated
year, and how to link the EB or EUC program eligibility with our annual data is unclear. For this
reason, we develop dummy variables only for 2010. The trigger information for the EB program is
from https://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/trigger. The trigger information for the EUC program is from
https://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc trigger.
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at -0.502 for the one-year growth rate. The magnitude of the estimate becomes smaller
than that for the two-year growth rate. Second, θ is estimated at -1.082 for the three-year
establishment growth rate, which is comparable to the estimate for the two-year growth
rate. The standard error of the estimate for the three-year growth rate is higher than that
for the two-year growth rate, which may reflect the fact that, over the three-year period,
other incidents that affect business activity may also have happened. Overall, these results
suggest that it takes some time for the effect of tax uncertainty to be realized, and the effect
tends to persist.
5 Conclusion
We develop a statewide tax uncertainty measure (TU measure) and provide some evidence
that it captures state corporate tax uncertainty. To identify a causal relationship between
the TU measure and business activities, we compare the difference in the growth rate of
the number of establishments in counties near a state border. The baseline estimates indi-
cate that a 10% increase in tax uncertainty leads to about a 0.11% point decrease in the
growth rate of the number of establishments over two years. The result holds after con-
ducting a variety of robustness checks and is not likely to be driven by general state-policy
uncertainties.
Although we show evidence that our TU measure is positively correlated with the true
tax uncertainty, our TU measure may inevitably contain a measurement error. As a result,
from the usual measurement error bias argument, the estimates for the TU measure may be
biased toward zero. In this sense, our result may be interpreted as a lower bound of the true
effect of tax policy uncertainty. Nevertheless, our result clearly shows that tax uncertainty
has a significant, negative impact on business activity in the United States.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics for State Tax Rates (%)
Mean Median Std. dev.
Maximum corporate income tax 6.51 6.97 2.63
Maximum personal income tax 5.23 5.82 2.70
Sales tax 5.28 5.5 1.34
∆Maximum corporate income tax -0.03 0 0.37
∆Maximum personal income tax 0.02 0 0.33
∆Sales tax 0.06 0 0.27
NOTE: The number is calculated for 37 states between 2001 and 2010 for which the TU measure is available.
Those states include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. ∆ stands for
one-year difference in each tax rate.
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Table 2: TU Measure and State Tax Changes in the Following Year (All States)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Corp. tax change Personal tax change Sales tax change
ln(TU) 0.148** -0.0893 0.110
(0.0669) (0.112) (0.0804)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 333 333 333
R-squared 0.356 0.405 0.222
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: TU Measure and State Corporate Tax Changes in the Following Year (All States)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Corp. tax increase Corp. tax decrease
ln(TU) 0.120** 0.0473
(0.0563) (0.0454)
Year FE Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Observations 316 323
R-squared 0.273 0.300
NOTE: The first regression is based on the sample that excludes the state corporate tax decrease. As a
consequence, Corp. tax increase refers to the dummy variable indicating a state corporate tax increase in the
following year. The second regression is based on the sample that excludes the state corporate tax increase.
As a consequence, Corp. tax decrease refers to the dummy variable indicating a state corporate tax decrease
in the following year. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 4: TU Measure and State Corporate Tax Changes in the Following Year (States that
experienced a Corporate Tax Change)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Corp. tax change Corp. tax increase Corp. tax decrease
ln(TU) 0.651** 0.541** 0.376
(0.249) (0.225) (0.230)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99 82 89
R-squared 0.405 0.436 0.378
NOTE: States that experienced a corporate tax change include Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee. The samples for the second
and the third regressions are constructed as in Table 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: TU Measure and State Corporate Tax Changes in the Following Year (Controlling
for the Expected Tax Rate)
All States 11 States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Corp. tax change Corp. tax change Corp. tax change Corp. tax change
ln(TU) 0.148** 0.145** 0.651** 0.645**
(0.0669) (0.0663) (0.249) (0.243)
Other c.tax 3.509* 3.910*
(1.872) (1.834)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 333 333 99 99
Adj. R-sq. 0.253 0.289 0.252 0.305
NOTE: Other c.tax refers to the average of other states’ corporate tax rates. The 11 states are states that
experienced a corporate tax change (Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
34
Table 6: TU Measure and State Corporate Tax Changes in the Following Year (without
Michigan and Ohio)
11 States w.o MI & OH
VARIABLES Corp. tax change Corp. tax decrease Corp. tax change Corp. tax decrease
ln(TU) 0.651** 0.376 0.689** 0.466*
(0.249) (0.230) (0.274) (0.211)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 99 89 81 73
R-squared 0.405 0.378 0.429 0.438
NOTE: The results with 11 states are from Table 4, and are presented here for comparison. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Regressions for Two-year Est. Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES g g g g g
ln(TU) -1.073** -1.083** -1.225**
(0.476) (0.476) (0.542)
Corp. tax -0.000170 -0.0518 -0.0150 -0.0805 0.456
(0.110) (0.120) (0.112) (0.105) (0.374)
Personal tax -0.192 -0.0621 -0.214 -0.216 0.395
(0.257) (0.416) (0.219) (0.218) (0.573)
Sales tax 0.229 0.945 0.0858 0.0932 0.352
(0.461) (0.697) (0.446) (0.448) (1.012)
Min. wage 0.404 1.194 0.433 0.431 0.229
(0.570) (0.826) (0.537) (0.537) (0.534)
Other c.tax -2.087
(2.173)
Year≤ 2007 Yes
Border-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 580 1,100 1,100 770
R-squared 0.847 0.773 0.849 0.849 0.853
NOTE: g is the two-year establishment growth rate of each side of a state border, calculated by
yt+2−yt{
0.5×(yt+2+yt)
} × 100. In the second regression, we use only the 29 borders at which at least one of the
two sides experienced a change in state corporate tax rates between 2001 and 2010. Other c.tax refers to
the geometric average of other states’ corporate tax rates. Regression (5) includes observations from 2001
to 2007. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border and state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 8: Testing Cross-border Spillover Effect
(1)
VARIABLES gc
ln(TU)×Border -0.0222
(0.310)
Corp. tax×Border -0.0492
(0.0779)
Personal tax×Border -0.367
(0.293)
Sales tax×Border 0.00519
(0.192)
Min. wage×Border 0.135
(0.123)
State-Year FE Yes
County FE Yes
Observations 24,138
R-squared 0.346
NOTE: gc is the two-year establishment growth rates of a county, calculated by
yt+2−yt{
0.5×(yt+2+yt)
} × 100.
“Border” refers to the dummy variable indicating border counties. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Controlling for General Policy Uncertainty Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES g g g g
ln(TU) -1.100** -1.142** -1.046** -1.183**
(0.485) (0.497) (0.448) (0.459)
Budget cut 0.00261 0.00180
(0.00282) (0.00238)
Tight election -0.682 -0.641
(0.456) (0.408)
ln(PU) -0.0529 0.0513
(0.719) (0.661)
Corp. tax -0.00840 -0.0400 -0.0149 -0.0340
(0.112) (0.123) (0.111) (0.121)
Personal tax -0.225 -0.229 -0.213 -0.236
(0.202) (0.193) (0.220) (0.183)
Sales tax 0.0501 0.0989 0.0856 0.0737
(0.432) (0.447) (0.447) (0.436)
Min. wage 0.430 0.416 0.434 0.413
(0.537) (0.524) (0.540) (0.525)
Border-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100
Adj. R-sq. 0.618 0.620 0.617 0.619
NOTE: g is the two-year establishment growth rates of a border side, calculated by yt+2−yt{
0.5×(yt+2+yt)
} ×
100. “TU” refers to the TU measure. “Budget cut” is the state mid-year budget cut, normalized by
the state’s population. “Tight election” is state-year specific dummy variable indicating whether a state
experienced a tight gubernatorial race in that year. “PU” refers to the policy uncertainty measure generated
by the following trio of keywords: : “policy” or“policies”; “local” or “state”; “uncertain,” “uncertainty,”
or “uncertainties.” Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border and state. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Industry with Large vs. Small Proportion of Corporations
Large prop. of Inc. Small prop. of Inc.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES g g
ln(TU) -1.316* 0.852
(0.749) (1.095)
Corp. tax 0.0831 -0.227
(0.139) (0.160)
Personal tax -0.051 0.110
(0.369) (0.450)
Sales tax -0.484 0.956
(0.529) (0.732)
Min. wage -0.944 -0.304
(0.711) (0.540)
Border-Year FE Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.782 0.704
NOTE: The variable definition is the same as in Table 7. Industries with a large proportion of corporations
include “Manufacturing,” “Wholesale trade,” “Information,” and “Finance, insurance, real estate, and rental
and leasing.” Industries with a small proportion of corporations include “Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
and Hunting,” “Other Services (except Public Administration),” “Educational Services and Health Care
and Social Assistance,” and “Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services.” Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered by border and state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Other Outcome Variables
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Employment growth Job-creation rate from births
ln(TU) -2.116** -0.112
(1.022) (0.240)
Corp. tax -0.152 0.0462
(0.225) (0.0346)
Personal tax -0.388 0.183
(0.811) (0.155)
Sales tax -0.255 -0.189
(0.471) (0.292)
Min. wage 0.809 0.183
(0.964) (0.192)
Border-Year FE Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 880
R-squared 0.818 0.780
NOTE: Employment growth is the two-year employment growth rates of a border side, calculated by
Et+2−Et{
0.5×(Et+2+Et)
} × 100, where Et is the employment level of a border side in year t. The employment
growth is constructed by using the CBP. Job-creation rate from births of a border side in year t is calculated
as Emp at firm age 0-1Total emp. × 100 by using the Quarterly Workforce Indicator (QWI) of the U.S. Census Bureau.
Three states (Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi) in QWI do not cover the sample periods (2001 − 2010),
and the observations from those states are dropped. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by
border and state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Other Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES g g g g g g−1
ln(TU) -1.073** -1.012** -1.135** -1.101** -1.121* 0.483
(0.476) (0.491) (0.540) (0.481) (0.577) (0.456)
Corp. tax -0.0150 -0.0304 0.107 -0.0145 -0.0151 0.0186
(0.112) (0.117) (0.147) (0.113) (0.113) (0.0775)
Personal tax -0.214 -0.0841 -0.0244 -0.209 -0.224 -0.0934
(0.219) (0.282) (0.293) (0.229) (0.213) (0.181)
Sales tax 0.0858 0.288 -0.163 0.00116 0.00796 -0.0945
(0.446) (0.489) (0.548) (0.447) (0.458) (0.197)
Min. wage 0.433 0.475 0.293 0.435 0.488 -0.291
(0.537) (0.606) (0.501) (0.532) (0.546) (0.243)
Realized× ln(TU) 0.101
(0.0661)
No-outlier Yes
EB -1.220**
(0.561)
EUC4 -1.459*
(0.779)
Without LA/MS Yes
Border-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 1,000 990 1,100 980 1,100
R-squared 0.849 0.846 0.866 0.850 0.843 0.783
NOTE: g is the two-year establishment growth rate of each side of a state border, calculated by
yt+2−yt{
0.5×(yt+2+yt)
} × 100. The first regression is identical to the third regression in Table 7. In the second
regression, we remove five borders at which the difference in the number of establishments between sides is
the largest. “Realized” is the dummy variable indicating whether the state to which a border side belongs
changed the state corporate tax in the following year. EB is a dummy variable for states that were eligible
for the Extended Benefits (EB) program at the end of 2010. EUC4 is a dummy variable for states that were
eligible for tier 4 of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program, as well as for the EB at
the end of 2010. In the fifth regression, we exclude the observations from Louisiana (LA) and Mississippi
(MS). g−1 refers to the one-year growth rate in the previous year defined as
yt−1−yt−2{
0.5×(yt−1+yt−2)
} ×100. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border and state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Different Time Periods
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES g+1 g g+3
ln(TU) -0.502 -1.073** -1.082
(0.354) (0.476) (0.649)
Corp. tax -0.0305 -0.0150 -0.0318
(0.0694) (0.112) (0.141)
Personal tax -0.0473 -0.214 -0.417
(0.158) (0.219) (0.303)
Sales tax 0.187 0.0858 0.0305
(0.292) (0.446) (0.532)
Min. wage 0.0791 0.433 0.730
(0.309) (0.537) (0.630)
Border-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.800 0.849 0.883
NOTE: g+1 refers to one-year growth rate defined as
yt+1−yt{
0.5×(yt+1+yt)
} × 100. g is the two-year establishment
growth rate of each side of a state border, calculated by yt+2−yt{
0.5×(yt+2+yt)
} × 100. The second regression is
identical to the third regression in Table 7. g+3 refers to three-year growth rate defined as
yt+3−yt{
0.5×(yt+3+yt)
} ×
100. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by border and state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: One-year Percentage Change of TU Measure
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NOTE: This figure depicts the one-year percentage change of TU for all the available states and time. The
mean and standard deviation are 0.01 and 0.31, respectively. States in which the TU measure is not available
include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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Figure 2: Ave. and Std. of One-year Percentage Change of TU Measure for Each State
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NOTE: This figure depicts the average and standard deviation of the one-year percentage change of TU
measure for each state. States in which the TU measure is not available include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii,
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia,
Vermont, and Wyoming.
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Figure 3: Number of Establishments in Counties within 25 miles of State Borders
NOTE: This figure depicts the number of establishments in counties within 25 miles of state borders in
2001. Counties in the states in which the TU measure is not available are dropped. Those states include
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, West Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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Appendix
A Theoretical Framework
A.1 Environment
In this section, we present a simple model that illustrates how tax uncertainty can affect en-
trepreneurs’ investment decisions. Consider an entrepreneur with productivity k who has an in-
vestment project. We assume that k is fixed over time. Let τ0 be the current tax rate. The
entrepreneur decides whether to invest in the project this period or wait until the next period. If
the entrepreneur invests, he needs to pay a fixed cost K. Let pi (k) denote the profit per period
before paying the tax.
Assumption pi (k) is continuous and differentiable with respect to k, pi (0) = 0, and dpi(k)dk > 0
for all k.
pˆi (k, τ0) = (1− τ0)pi (k) is the profit after paying the tax. The tax rate may change in the next
period. We assume that the tax can either increase to τH or decrease to τL. Thus, τL < τ0 < τH .
The transition matrix is assumed to be
M =

mLL mL0 0
m0L m00 m0H
0 mH0 mHH
 .
The assumption imposed here is the existence of an interim state through which a high tax regime
can be reached from a low tax regime, and vice versa.28
28We need three states because in the current state (state 0), tax can either increase or decrease. With
three states, we can change the probability of tax changes in the next period while the expected tax rate is
fixed.
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A.2 Characterization
We denote the expected value of the investment as Ve (k, τ) and the value of waiting as Vw (k, τ).
The value functions can be represented as below:
Ve (k, τs) = pˆi (k, τs) + β
∑
s′
mss′Ve (k, τs′) for each s ∈ {L, 0, H} (9)
Vw (k, τs) = β
∑
s′
mss′ max[Ve (k, τs′)−K,Vw (k, τs′)], (10)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
Proposition 1 For each tax level, a cutoff k¯s exists such that the entrepreneur will invest
only if the productivity is above the cutoff. The cutoffs should satisfy k¯L < k¯0 < k¯H .
Proof Using the definitions of Ve (k, τs)and Vw (k, τs) in (9) and (10), we have
Ve (k, τs)− Vw (k, τs) = pˆi (k, τs) + β
∑
s′
mss′Ve (k, τs′)− β
∑
s′
mss′ max[Ve (k, τs′)−K,Vw (k, τs′)]
= pˆi (k, τs) + β
∑
s′
mss′ [Ve (k, τs′)− Vw (k, τs′)]
−β
∑
s′
mss′ max[Ve (k, τs′)− Vw (k, τs′)−K, 0].
The above mapping is a contraction mapping T, defining a fixed point Ve (k, τs)− Vw (k, τs),
Ve (k, τs)− Vw (k, τs) = T [Ve (k, τs)− Vw (k, τs)].
Given that pˆi (k, τs) is increasing in k and decreasing in τ , we can verify that Ve (k, τs)− Vw (k, τs)
is increasing in k and decreasing in τ . Also, because pˆi(0, τs) is zero, Ve (0, τs) − Vw (0, τs) is zero,
as well. (Stokey and Lucas [1989])
For a given tax rate τs, an entrepreneur is indifferent between investing and waiting if his
productivity is k¯s, defined as below:
Ve
(
k¯s, τs
)− Vw (k¯s, τs) = K. (11)
Because Ve (k, τs)−Vw (k, τs) is increasing in k for any τs, a unique cutoff k¯s exists for each tax rate
τs. An entrepreneur will invest only if the productivity is above the cutoff. Because Ve (k, τs) −
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Vw (k, τs) is decreasing in τs for any k, we get k¯L < k¯0 < k¯H .
We plot Ve (k, τs) − Vw (k, τs) in Figure 4. The x-axis is productivity k and the y-axis is the
value. From left to right, the curve denotes the tax rates τL, τ0 and τH , respectively. We can see
that k¯L < k¯0 < k¯H .
Figure 4: The productivity cutoffs
Now, suppose that the current tax rate is τ0. If no uncertainty exists (if the tax rate never
changes from τ0), the value from the investment is
pˆi(k,τ0)
1−β . The cutoffs without uncertainty will be
denoted as k¯D0 , which satisfies
pˆi
(
k¯D0 , τ0
)
1− β = K. (12)
Proposition 2 Given that τH > τ0 and 0 < β < 1, k¯0 is greater than k¯
D
0 .
Proof See Section A.2.1.
To understand the above proposition, we can consider a special case β = 0. In this case, all
value functions are just equal to the static profits. Therefore, k¯0 = k¯
D
0 . Proposition 2 says that
if the entrepreneur cares about the future value, the productivity cutoff is higher in the uncertain
environment than in the certain environment.
Proposition 3 Suppose that τH > τ0 and 0 < β < 1. Denote γ = m0L + m0H so that
τˆ = m0Hγ τH +
m0L
γ τL is the expected tax rate conditional on tax rate changes. If τˆ is fixed,
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∂ ln k¯0
∂γ > 0.
Proof See Section A.2.2.
We say that tax uncertainty becomes higher if the probability of tax changes in the next period
(γ) becomes higher while the expected tax rate remains fixed. Given that the expected tax rate is
fixed, the proposition says that the cutoff k¯0 increases as γ increases. As a result, entrepreneurs
find it more difficult to invest in a more uncertain environment. This finding is in line with the
“real option” literature.
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that pi
(
k¯0
)
= ∆0pi
(
k¯D0
)
> pi
(
k¯D0
)
, where ∆0 is a constant, and greater than 1.
Because pi (k) is monotonically increasing in k, this is sufficient to show that k¯0 > k¯
D
0 .
To begin with, we can represent the value functions as below, given the structure of the transition
matrix.
Ve (k, τs) =
pˆi (k, τs) + βms0Ve (k, τ0)
1− βmss , s ∈ {L,H} (13)
Ve (k, τ0) =
pˆi (k, τ0)
1− βm0 +
β
1− βm0
∑
s 6=0
m0s
pˆi (k, τs)
1− βmss , (14)
where m0 = m00 + β[m0L
mL0
1−βmLL +m0H
mH0
1−βmHH ].
If k > k¯H , the firm will choose to enter the market despite the tax rate. If k < k¯L, the firm
will never choose to enter the market. Let us consider a firm whose productivity is between k¯L and
k¯0. Assume that today’s tax rate is τ0. The firm will choose to wait this period. If the tax rate
declines next period, the firm will choose to enter next period. The value of waiting at the current
state can be written as
Vw (k, τ0) = β[m00Vw (k, τ0) +m0HVw (k, τH) +m0L(Ve (k, τL)−K)] if k ∈ [k¯L, k¯0]. (15)
With probability m00, the tax rate does not change, and the firm will wait until next period. With
probability m0H , the tax rate will increase, and the firm will also choose to wait. With probability
m0L, the firm will enter the market because the tax rate goes down and the productivity is between
k¯L and k¯0.
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Lemma 1 The value of waiting evaluated at k¯0 is
Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
=
βm0L
1− β(m00 +m0H βmH01−βmHH )
[
pˆi
(
k¯0, τL
)
+ βmL0Ve
(
k¯0, τ0
)
1− βmLL −K]. (16)
Proof Notice that, at productivity k¯0, the firm will choose to wait if the tax is τH in the
next period and will be indifferent between wait and enter if the tax is τ0 in the next period, so we
have
Vw
(
k¯0, τH
)
= β[mHHVw
(
k¯0, τH
)
+mH0Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
] (17)
Vw
(
k¯0, τH
)
=
βmH0Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
1− βmHH . (18)
Substituting the above equation into equation (15), we have
Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
=
β
1− βm00
{
m0H
βmH0Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
1− βmHH +m0L(Ve (k, τL)−K)
}
.
Combining with equation (13), we get
Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
=
β
1− βm00
{
m0H
βmH0Vw
(
k¯0, τ0
)
1− βmHH +m0L[
pˆi
(
k¯0, τL
)
+ βmL0Ve
(
k¯0, τ0
)
1− βmLL −K]
}
.
By simplifying the above equation, we get the lemma.
Define m˜ = m0L +m00 +m0H
βmH0
1−βmHH . Combining equation (11) with (16), we get
Ve
(
k¯0, τ0
)−K = βm0L
1− β(m˜−m0L)
[
pˆi
(
k¯0, τL
)
+ βmL0Ve
(
k¯0, τ0
)
1− βmLL −K
]
⇔
(
1− β
(
(m˜−m0L) + βm0LmL0
1− βmLL
))
Ve(k¯0, τ0) =
βm0Lpˆi
(
k¯0, τL
)
1− β(m˜−m0L) +K (1− βm˜) . (19)
By combining equations (14) and (19), we get
pˆi
(
k¯0, τ0
)
+ β
∑
s 6=0
m0s
pˆi (k, τs)
1− βmss =
βm0Lpˆi
(
k¯0, τL
)
1− βmLL +K (1− βm˜)
⇔ pˆi (k¯0, τ0)+ βm0H
1− βmHH pˆi
(
k¯0, τH
)
= K (1− βm˜) .
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Notice that pˆi
(
k¯0, τ
)
= (1− τ)pi (k¯0). Hence,
(1− τ0)pi
(
k¯0
)
+
βm0H
1− βmHH (1− τH)pi
(
k¯0
)
= K (1− βm˜)
⇔ pi (k¯0) = K (1− βm˜)
(1− τ0) + βm0H1−βmHH (1− τH)
.
Notice that pˆi
(
k¯D0 , τ0
)
= pi
(
k¯D0
)
(1− τ0) = (1− β)K. Hence,
pi
(
k¯D0
)
pi
(
k¯0
) = (1− β)
(1− βm˜)
[
1 +
βm0H
1− βmHH
(1− τH)
(1− τ0)
]
⇔ pi (k¯0) = ∆0pi (k¯D0 ) ,
where ∆0 =
(1−βm˜)
(1−β)
[
1 + βm0H1−βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
]−1
. The above equation says that the static profit at the
uncertain environment cutoff k¯0 is proportional to the static profit at the certain environment cutoff
k¯D0 .
We then show that ∆0 > 1 if and only if τH > τ0 and β > 0.
∆0 > 1⇔ (1− β)
(1− βm˜)
[
1 +
βm0H
1− βmHH
(1− τH)
(1− τ0)
]
< 1⇔
(1− β) βm0H
1− βmHH
(1− τH)
(1− τ0) < (1− βm˜)− (1− β)⇔
m0H
1− βmHH
(1− τH)
(1− τ0) <
m0H
1− βmHH ,
where the last step uses the definition of m˜ = m0L +m00 +m0H
βmH0
1−βmHH = 1−m0H +m0H
βmH0
1−βmHH
and β > 0. Therefore, we have shown that pi
(
k¯0
)
= ∆0pi
(
k¯D0
)
> pi
(
k¯D0
)
.
To understand the above result, let β = 0, and we can see that ∆0 = 1, which suggests that
k¯0 = k¯
D
0 . So, if the entrepreneur does not care about the future value, future uncertainty has no
impact on his decision. The cutoff will be the same as in the certain environment.
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Let γ = m0L + m0H . Denote mH =
1
γm0H , which is the probability that the tax rate is high,
conditional on the tax rate going up or down. Then, m˜ = 1 − γmH + γmH βmH01−βmHH , and ∆0 can
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be represented as:
∆0 =
(
1− β(1− γmH + γmH βmH01−βmHH )
)
(1− β)
[
1 +
βγmH
1− βmHH
(1− τH)
(1− τ0)
]−1
. (20)
Notice that the expected tax rate, conditional on tax rate changes, is τˆ = mHτH + (1−mH) τL.
Therefore, as long as mH is fixed, τˆ does not change.
We will show that the partial derivative of ln ∆0 with respect to γ (while mH being fixed) is
positive. Given pi
(
k¯0
)
= ∆0pi
(
k¯D0
)
, and the monotonicity of pi on k, this is sufficient to show that
k¯0 > 0 increases when γ increases, conditional on the expected tax rate.
Note that
∂ ln ∆0
∂γ
=
∂ ln (1− βm˜)
∂m˜
∂m˜
∂γ
−
∂ ln
[
1 + βγmH1−βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
]
∂γ
.
The first term of the above equation can be rewritten as
∂ ln (1− βm˜)
∂m˜
∂m˜
∂γ
=
βmH
1− βmHH
(
1− β
1− βm˜
)
.
The second term can be written as
∂ ln
[
1 + βγmH1−βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
]
∂γ
=
βmH
1− βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
1 + βγmH1−βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
.
Then, we have
∂ ln ∆0
∂γ
=
βmH
1− βmHH
 1− β
1− βm˜ −
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
1 + βγmH1−βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
 .
We argue that the term 1−β1−βm˜ −
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
1+
βγmH
1−βmHH
(1−τH)
(1−τ0)
in the big bracket is positive, showing that
(1− τH)
(1− τ0) <
(
1− β
1− βm˜
)(
1 +
βγmH
1− βmHH
(1− τH)
(1− τ0)
)
or that
(1− τH)
(1− τ0)
[
1− βγmH
1− βmHH
(
1− β
1− βm˜
)]
<
1− β
1− βm˜.
Using the definition of m˜, we can verify that 1 − βγmH1−βmHH
(
1−β
1−βm˜
)
= 1−β1−βm˜ > 0. Therefore, the
above inequality holds if and only if τH > τ0. This completes the proof.
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B The Measure without the Uncertainty Terms
To see the role of the terms related to “uncertainty,” we generate another measure with the following
key words: “tax,” “taxes,” “taxed,” or “taxation” and “local” or “state.” Except for removing the
terms “uncertain,” “uncertainty,” or “uncertainties” from the benchmark keywords, the measure-
generating procedure is identical, as explained in Section 2.1.
We first show the relationship between this newly-generated measure and the probability of
tax changes in the following year. The result is shown in Table 14. We also present the result
with the TU measure for comparison. The measure without the uncertainty terms shows a positive
relationship with the probability of tax changes in the following year, but the magnitude becomes
smaller and the coefficient becomes insignificant compared to the result with the benchmark TU
measure.
Second, we estimate the main specification with the measure without the uncertainty terms.
The result is shown in Table 15. We also present the result with the TU measure for comparison.
Contrary to the TU measure, which exhibits a negative relationship with the establishment growth
rate, the measure without the uncertainty terms shows no relationship with the establishment
growth rates.
To summarize, the measure without the uncertainty terms does not predict the tax changes
in the following year and shows no relationship with the establishment growth rates. This find-
ing suggests that including uncertainty terms in the keywords is important to capture the tax
uncertainty.
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Table 14: State Corporate Tax Changes: TU Measure vs. Measure without the Uncertainty
Terms
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Corp. tax change Corp. tax change
ln(TU) 0.689**
(0.274)
ln(No uncertain) 0.412
(0.275)
Year FE Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes
Observations 81 81
R-squared 0.429 0.348
NOTE: The first column shows the linear regression result for the TU measure with nine states, without
Michigan and Ohio. The result is identical to the third column in Table 6, and is presented here for
comparison. The second column shows the linear regression result for the measure without the uncertainty
terms (No uncertain). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 15: Two-year Est. Growth Rate: TU Measure vs. Measure without the Uncertainty
Terms
(1) (2)
VARIABLES g g
ln(TU) -1.073**
(0.476)
ln(No uncertain) -0.258
(0.523)
Corp. tax -0.0150 -0.00737
(0.112) (0.114)
Personal tax -0.214 -0.191
(0.219) (0.254)
Sales tax 0.0858 0.201
(0.446) (0.477)
Min. wage 0.433 0.412
(0.537) (0.560)
Border-Year FE Yes Yes
Border-Side FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,100 1,100
R-squared 0.849 0.847
NOTE: g is the two-year establishment growth rates of a border side, calculated by yt+2−yt{
0.5×(yt+2+yt)
} × 100.
“No uncertain” refers to the measure generated without the uncertainty terms. The result in the first
column is from the second column in Table 7, and is presented here for comparison. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by border and state. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C Newspapers for Each State
Table 16: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Alabama Anniston Star, The (AL)
Atmore Advance, The (AL)
Birmingham News (AL)
Cleburne News, The (AL)
Daily Home, The (Talladega, AL)
Daily Mountain Eagle (Jasper, AL)
Huntsville Times, The (AL)
Jacksonville News, The (AL)
Press-Register (Mobile, AL)
Valley Times-News, The (Lanett, AL)
Arizona Arizona City Independent (AZ)
Arizona Daily Star, The (Tucson, AZ)
Casa Grande Dispatch (AZ)
Douglas Dispatch (AZ)
Eastern Arizona Courier (Safford, AZ)
Green Valley News & Sun (AZ)
Inside Tucson Business (AZ)
San Pedro Valley News-Sun (Benson, AZ)
Tucson Weekly (AZ)
Wickenburg Sun, The (AZ)
Arkansas Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock, AR)
Daily Siftings Herald (Arkadelphia, AR)
Daily World, The (Helena, West Helena, AR)
Hope Star (AR)
Newport Independent (AR)
Pine Bluff Commercial (AR)
Stuttgart Daily Leader, The (AR)
Times Record (Fort Smith, AR)
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Table 17: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
California Daily Breeze (Torrance, CA)
Daily News of Los Angeles (CA)
Fresno Bee, The (CA)
Long Beach Press-Telegram (CA)
Mercury News, The (San Jose, CA)
Modesto Bee, The (CA)
Orange County Register, The (Santa Ana, CA)
Sacramento Bee, The (CA)
San Diego Union-Tribune, The (CA)
San Francisco Chronicle (CA)
Colorado Broomfield Enterprise (Boulder, CO)
Colorado Springs Business Journal (CO)
Daily Camera, The (Boulder, CO)
Denver Post, The (CO)
Durango Herald, The (CO)
Gazette, The (Colorado Springs, CO)
La Junta Tribune-Democrat (CO)
Montrose Daily Press, The (CO)
Connecticut Bulletin, The (Norwich, CT)
Chronicle, The (Willimantic, CT)
Fairfield County Weekly (Bridgeport, CT)
Hartford Advocate (CT)
Hartford Courant, The (CT)
Milford Mirror (CT)
New Haven Advocate (CT)
New Haven Register (CT)
News-Times, The (Danbury, CT)
Record-Journal (Meriden, CT)
Florida Bradenton Herald, The (FL)
Gainesville Sun, The (FL)
Ledger, The (Lakeland, FL)
Miami Herald, The (FL)
Miami New Times (FL)
Naples Daily News (FL)
Ocala Star-Banner (FL)
Palm Beach Post, The (FL)
Tampa Bay Times (FL)
Tampa Tribune, The (FL)
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Table 18: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Georgia Athens Banner-Herald (GA)
Atlanta Daily World (GA)
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The (GA)
Augusta Chronicle, The (GA)
Cherokee Tribune (Canton, GA)
Daily Tribune News, The (Cartersville, GA)
Ledger-Enquirer (Columbus, GA)
Macon Telegraph, The (GA)
Marietta Daily Journal (GA)
Savannah Morning News (GA)
Idaho Idaho Business Review (Boise, ID)
Idaho Statesman, The (Boise, ID)
Lewiston Morning Tribune (ID)
Moscow-Pullman Daily News, The (ID)
Post Register (Idaho Falls, ID)
Times-News, The (Twin Falls, ID)
Illinois Barrington Courier-Review (IL)
Buffalo Grove Countryside (IL)
Chicago Sun-Times (IL)
Daily Herald (Arlington Heights, IL)
Deerfield Review (IL)
Herald & Review (Decatur, IL)
Pantagraph, The (Bloomington, IL)
Peoria Journal Star, The (IL)
Southern Illinoisan (IL)
State Journal-Register, The (Springfield, IL)
Indiana Boonville Standard & Newburgh-Chandler Register (IN)
Chronicle-Tribune (Marion, IN)
Evansville Courier & Press (IN)
Herald-Times (Bloomington, IN)
Journal Gazette, The (Fort Wayne, IN)
Madison Courier, The (IN)
News-Dispatch, The (Michigan City, IN)
News-Sentinel, The (Fort Wayne, IN)
Post-Tribune (IN)
South Bend Tribune (IN)
58
Table 19: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Iowa Charles City Press (IA)
Daily Democrat (Fort Madison, IA)
Daily Gate City (Keokuk, IA)
Gazette, The (Cedar Rapids-Iowa City, IA)
Globe Gazette (Mason City, IA)
Hawk Eye, The (Burlington, IA)
Iowa State Daily (Ames, IA)
Kalona News (IA)
Sioux City Journal (IA)
Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA)
Kansas Chanute Tribune, The (KS)
Garden City Telegram, The (KS)
Hays Daily News, The (KS)
Manhattan Mercury, The (KS)
Morning Sun, The (Pittsburg, KS)
Newton Kansan, The (KS)
Ottawa Herald, The (KS)
Parsons Sun (KS)
Salina Journal, The (KS)
Wichita Eagle, The (KS)
Kentucky Daily News (Bowling Green, KY)
Georgetown News-Graphic (KY)
Grayson County News Gazette (Leitchfield, KY)
Lexington Herald-Leader (KY)
Messenger, The (Madisonville, KY)
News-Democrat & Leader (Russellville, KY)
Northerner, The: Northern Kentucky University
(Highland Heights, KY)
Owensboro Messenger-Inquirer (KY)
Louisiana Advocate, The (Baton Rouge, LA)
Bastrop Daily Enterprise (LA)
Beauregard Daily News (De Ridder, LA)
Daily News, The (Bogalusa, LA)
Daily Star, The (Hammond, LA)
Gonzales Weekly Citizen (Ascension, LA)
Hawkeye, The (University of Louisiana - Monroe) (LA)
L’Observateur (La Place, LA)
St. Tammany News (Covington, LA)
Times-Picayune, The (New Orleans, LA)
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Table 20: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Maryland Arbutus Times (MD)
Baltimore Messenger (MD)
Capital, The (includes 6 regional titles) (Annapolis, MD)
Carroll County Times (Westminster, MD)
Columbia Flier (MD)
Frederick News-Post, The (MD)
Herald-Mail, The (Hagerstown, MD)
Jewish Times (Baltimore, MD)
Sun, The (Baltimore, MD)
Towson Times (MD)
Massachusetts Boston Herald (MA)
Cape Cod Times (Hyannis, MA)
Enterprise, The (Brockton, MA)
Gatepost, The: Framingham State College (MA)
Herald News, The (Fall River, MA)
Patriot Ledger, The (Quincy, MA)
Provincetown Banner (MA)
Republican, The (Springfield, MA)
Taunton Daily Gazette (MA)
Worcester Telegram & Gazette (MA)
Michigan Cheboygan Daily Tribune (MI)
Coldwater Daily Reporter (MI)
Detroit News, The (MI)
Flint Journal, The (MI)
Herald-Palladium, The (St. Joseph, MI)
Holland Sentinel, The (MI)
Muskegon Chronicle, The (MI)
Record & Clarion (Gladwin, Beaverton, MI)
Saginaw News (MI)
Sturgis Journal (MI)
Minnesota Chanhassen Villager (MN)
Chaska Herald (MN)
City Pages (Minneapolis, MN)
Duluth News Tribune (MN)
Eden Prairie News (MN)
Fergus Falls Daily Journal (MN)
Hutchinson Leader (MN)
Jordan Independent (MN)
St. Paul Pioneer Press (MN)
Star Tribune: Newspaper of the Twin Cities (MN)
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Table 21: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Mississippi Bolivar Commercial, The (Cleveland, MS)
Clarksdale Press Register, The (MS)
Commercial Dispatch, The (Columbus, MS)
Daily Leader, The (Brookhaven, MS)
Enterprise-Journal (McComb, MS)
Greenwood Commonwealth, The (MS)
Natchez Democrat, The (MS)
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)
Missouri Boonville Daily News (MO)
Daily Journal (Park Hills, MO)
Examiner, The (Independence-Blues Springs-Grain Valley, MO)
Hannibal Courier-Post (MO)
Jefferson City News-Tribune (MO)
Kansas City Star, The (MO)
Lake Sun Leader (Camdenton, MO)
Maneater, The: University of Missouri (Columbia, MO)
Riverfront Times (St. Louis, MO)
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (MO)
Nebraska Columbus Telegram, The (NE)
Fremont Tribune (NE)
Grand Island Independent, The (NE)
Lincoln Journal Star (NE)
Omaha World-Herald (NE)
York News-Times (NE)
Nevada Henderson View (NV)
Las Vegas Review-Journal (NV)
Las Vegas Sun (NV)
North Las Vegas View (NV)
Pahrump Valley Times (NV)
Paradise View (Las Vegas, NV)
Southwest View (Las Vegas, NV)
Summerlin View (Las Vegas, NV)
Sunrise View (Las Vegas, NV)
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Table 22: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
New Jersey Herald News (Woodland Park, NJ)
Horse News (NJ)
Hudson Reporter Publications (NJ)
Hunterdon County Democrat (Flemington, NJ)
Hunterdon Observer (Flemington, NJ)
Jersey Journal, The (Jersey City, NJ)
Press of Atlantic City, The (NJ)
Record, The (Hackensack, NJ)
Star-Ledger, The (Newark, NJ)
Times, The (Trenton, NJ)
New York Buffalo News, The (NY)
City Limits (New York, NY)
Daily Gazette, The (Schenectady, NY)
Hicksville Illustrated News (NY)
Newsday (Long Island, NY)
New York Daily News (NY)
Post-Standard, The (Syracuse, NY)
Staten Island Advance (NY)
Times Union, The (Albany, NY)
Watertown Daily Times (NY)
North Carolina Charlotte Observer (NC)
Chronicle, The (Duke University) (Durham, NC)
Dispatch, The (Lexington, NC)
Fayetteville Observer, The (NC)
Herald-Sun, The
(includes Raleigh Extra and Chapel Hill Herald) (Durham, NC)
News & Observer, The (includes Chapel Hill News) (Raleigh, NC)
News & Record (Greensboro, NC)
Salisbury Post (NC)
StarNews (Wilmington, NC)
Winston-Salem Journal (NC)
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Table 23: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Ohio Akron Beacon Journal (OH)
Blade, The (Toledo, OH)
CityBeat (Cincinnati, OH)
Columbus Dispatch, The (OH)
Courier, The (Findlay, OH)
Daily Reporter, The (Columbus, OH)
Dayton Daily News (OH)
Lantern, The: Ohio State University (Columbus, OH)
Plain Dealer, The (Cleveland, OH)
Review Times (Fostoria, OH)
Oklahoma Alva Review-Courier (OK)
Bartlesville Examiner-Enterprise (OK)
Daily Ardmoreite, The (Ardmore, OK)
Journal Record, The (Oklahoma City, OK)
Lawton Constitution, The (OK)
Miami News-Record (OK)
Oklahoman, The (Oklahoma City, OK)
Shawnee News-Star, The (OK)
Tulsa World (OK)
Oregon Albany Democrat-Herald (OR)
Argus Observer (Ontario, OR)
Baker City Herald, The (OR)
Central Oregonian (Prineville, OR)
Corvallis Gazette-Times (OR)
Curry Coastal Pilot (Brookings, OR)
Herald and News (Klamath Falls, OR)
Hermiston Herald, The (OR)
Observer, The (La Grande, OR)
Oregonian, The (Portland, OR)
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Table 24: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Pennsylvania Centre Daily Times (State College, PA)
Daily Pennsylvanian, The: University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, PA)
Delaware County Daily Times (Primos - Upper Darby, PA)
Morning Call, The (Allentown, PA)
Patriot-News, The (Harrisburg, PA)
Philadelphia Daily News (PA)
Philadelphia Inquirer, The (PA)
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (PA)
Times Leader, The (Wilkes-Barre, PA)
York Daily Record (PA)
South Carolina Beaufort Gazette, The (SC)
Bluffton Today (SC)
Georgetown Times, The (SC)
Herald-Journal (Spartanburg, SC)
Island Packet (Hilton Head, SC)
Post and Courier, The (Charleston, SC)
State, The (Columbia, SC)
Sun News, The (Myrtle Beach, SC)
Tennessee Advocate and Democrat, The (Sweetwater, TN)
Chattanooga Times Free Press (TN)
Cleveland Daily Banner (TN)
Commercial Appeal, The (Memphis, TN)
Daily Post-Athenian, The (Athens, TN)
Daily Times, The (Maryville, TN)
Herald-Citizen (Cookeville, TN)
Knoxville News Sentinel (TN)
Nashville Scene (TN)
Oak Ridger, The (TN)
Texas Austin American-Statesman (TX)
Austin Monitor (TX)
Brownsville Herald, The (TX)
Corpus Christi Caller-Times (TX)
Dallas Morning News, The (TX)
Dallas Observer (TX)
Fort Worth Star-Telegram (TX)
Houston Chronicle (TX)
Houston Press (TX)
San Antonio Express-News (TX)
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Table 25: State Newspaper Lists
State Newspapers
Utah Daily Herald (Provo, UT)
Deseret News, The (Salt Lake City, UT)
Herald Journal, The (Logan, UT)
Park Record (Park City, UT)
Salt Lake Tribune, The (UT)
Standard-Examiner (Ogden, UT)
Sun Advocate (Price, UT)
Virginia Arlington Catholic Herald (VA)
Daily News-Record (Harrisonburg, VA)
Martinsville Bulletin (VA)
Progress-Index, The (Petersburg, VA)
Richmond Times-Dispatch (VA)
Roanoke Times, The (VA)
Virginian-Pilot, The (Norfolk, VA)
Washington Bellingham Herald, The (WA)
Central Kitsap Reporter (Silverdale, WA)
Columbian, The (Vancouver, WA)
Kitsap Sun (Bremerton, WA)
News Tribune, The (Tacoma, WA)
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (WA)
Seattle Times, The (WA)
Spokesman-Review, The (Spokane, WA)
Wenatchee World, The (WA)
Yakima Herald-Republic (WA)
Wisconsin Beloit Daily News (WI)
Capital Times, The (Madison, WI)
Chippewa Herald, The (Chippewa Falls, WI)
Freeman, The (Waukesha, WI)
La Crosse Tribune (WI)
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (WI)
News Graphic (Cedarburg, WI)
Northwoods River News, The (Rhinelander, WI)
Washington County Daily News (WI)
Wisconsin State Journal (WI)
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